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Context 
Contemporary France has a North African dilemma. Digesting and assimilating immigrants 
from the region has proven to be a major challenge. The country, like numerous western states with 
high levels of immigration, is facing conundrums in equitable housing, inclusive workforces, and 
plural governance for ethnic communities. What distinguishes the French case from others in 
Western Europe, though, is the unusually high level of polarization between native French and 
North African Muslim citizens and residents in societal, economic, political, and cultural 
opportunity. The exceptional nature of the French colonial experience and the direct result it had 
on mass immigration into the country in the 1960s and 1970s, coupled with staunch values of 
laicism and French exceptionalism, seem to have resulted in a remarkable degree of antagonism 
directed towards migrant communities. This has resulted in turn in increased animosity between 
the two groups as they try to reconcile their respective identities. My objective for this paper is to 
view the fundamental reasons why integration has been stunted to such a degree in the French case 
and why the ensuing polarization along the lines of co-habitation, economic inclusiveness, and 
religious identity has become so prevalent.   
It is important to note at this preliminary stage of the paper that I will be focusing 
particularly on the North African, Arab communities that make up the most sizable and apparent 
group of Muslims in the country. These citizens and residents originating in the contemporary 
states of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia present the most pointed group through which to view the 
myriad of factors contributing to the pervasive societal strain present in France as it shapes its 
post-colonial identity. While other predominantly Islamic groups experienced French colonialism 
or took part in the mass emigration from the Global South at the conclusion of the World Wars, 
particularly black Africans of the Sahel, Arabs of the Levant, and to a lesser extent, Turks, 
commentary and analysis of the North African Arab Muslim communities from the former French 
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colonies there will be the focus here since that is where the assimilation problem is most severe. 
This is due in part to the divisive relation between a largely Islamic identity and French secular 
values, the sheer numbers of people from this region that have settled in France, and the deeply-
engrained, even aggravated, nature of the French relation to the area and its people. 
 
North Africans in France 
In a mapping of where North Africans fit into the French social mosaic, there are several 
preliminaries that need to be set out. In the first place there are issues of nomenclature. In this 
regard, I will first differentiate between the terms citizen, resident, and immigrant, as all too often 
“the term ‘immigrant’ [has been] used to describe widely different populations, even groups that 
have been in France for generations” (Lloyd & Waters 51). When employing the term citizen I will 
be describing any French North African Arab who holds French citizenship, whether they are recent 
recipients of it or if they and their families have been citizens since North Africans first started 
coming to France en masse. Resident can be used to denote those that live and work in France, but 
still hold citizenship in the Maghreb nations of Morocco, Algeria, or Tunisia. Finally, immigrant will 
be utilized when delving into the historical sections of this paper, as they refer to a point when the 
majority of North African Arabs were neither citizens nor residents. Additionally, I will attempt to 
avoid the use of the term “Muslim” outside of specific cultural and religious commentary, as it “can 
denote a myriad of socio-cultural, religious, and political connotations” (House) that if read in a 
manner different from what I intend, could affect the point that I am attempting to make. For 
specific social, economic, and political contexts, I will strive for a much more direct “North African 
Arab” or “North African community” and avoid as much religious connotation as possible. 
Nomenclature aside, the second general point to make is that documenting the North 
African presence in France, their geographic and social distribution among other things, is not 
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always straightforward. This is owing to a refusal on the part of the responsible government 
authorities to differentiate the population according to ethnic background. French authorities 
proclaim that race is not a factor in French society, thus historically marginalized racial groups are 
all-too-often neglected in the mechanisms of social welfare because their individual needs are not 
met.  Occasionally there is reference to where immigrants came from, but if they are no longer 
immigrants but rather residents or citizens, it can be difficult to acquire statistics that comment on 
their social conditions. This void in provision of government services is often filled through the 
efforts of private organizations. 
 
A History of Immigration 
 The fact that a very large number of people living in France trace their genealogy back to 
the former French colonies of North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, is significant. Taken 
collectively we can trace a history of immigration into France. For adequate spatial perspective, 
Figure 1 presents France’s geographic relationship to the three colonies, represented here as 
contemporary nation-states. 
Figure 1 – Map of France and North West Africa, or the Maghreb 
 
Source: Yale University Library 
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With dominion firmly established over the majority of the Maghreb by the early 1900s, 
France began importing substantial numbers of North African laborers: what may be thought of as 
the “first wave” of immigration into the country. Part of the context for this was the limited work 
prospects at home spurred by the hegemony of settler communities and, particularly in the case of 
Algeria, French appropriation of land.  However, the blatant animosity that the French held towards 
their Arab subjects was already developing.1 Despite Algeria being an integral part of France and 
Tunisia and Morocco as entities of Greater France, Frenchmen did little to understand the cultures 
of these “zones of departure”, meaning that the prospect of healthy assimilation was stunted from 
the outset (MacMaster 9). The French simply looked scornfully and resentfully upon these subjects 
as commodities, as units of labor power, and not as participants in a common society. This feeling of 
superiority that the French cultivated in viewing North Africa left an indelible mark that would 
continue to plague their society as additional episodes of immigration commenced.  
 The outbreak of the Great War then necessitated a more conscious large-scale migration 
strategy on the part of the French government so as to assist in the war effort, and this assistance 
came primarily in the shape of the colonial guest worker. These were laborers that arrived on 
temporary status who helped with war-damage reconstruction and the manning of industrial 
facilities. During the First World War, some 120,000 workers were shuttled in from the Maghreb, 
including 78,566 Algerians, 25,506 Moroccans, and 18,249 Tunisians who “were essentially 
brought in as forced labour” (Stovall 3).  An important feature of this period in Maghrebi-Franco 
immigration was the institutional subordination of the North African. The government introduced a 
program of encadrement, or regimentation, in which “All aspects of the lives of non-white workers 
                                                          
1
 As presented by Neil MacMaster in Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France, 1900-62, -“This early 
colonial development, which was already under way in 1910-1920, established deep-rooted patterns of 
stereotyping, marginalisation and discrimination that have continued to leave a deep imprint on French 
society” (MacMaster 2). 
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in France were set by SOTC [the Colonial Labour Organisation Service], with an eye on keeping 
them as isolated from the French population as possible” (Stovall 7).  
 In addition to guest workers, and quite crucially, hundreds of thousands of North African 
and French West African subjects laid down their lives for the French cause in battle. These troops 
were viewed as largely expendable, used in wave attacks in-between trench encampments that saw 
thousands of them gunned down by machine gun fire. Additionally, these troops served in some of 
the harshest trench conditions of the war, succumbing to all manner of disease that the 
environment presented. It is approximated that Algeria alone fronted 173,000 soldiers, with tens of 
thousands of additional troops arriving from Morocco and Tunisia. The blatant disregard for the 
well-being of these troops serve as yet another example of the prevailing sense of North African 
inferiority, “viewed through [the] prism of backwardness… considered indolent and incompetent” 
in the eyes of the French (Laurence 50).  
 The onset of the Second World War also necessitated a mass transfer of workers and 
soldiers from North Africa. During the early years of the war, the French government ordered the 
governors of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine to each contribute 10,000 laborers for work in France 
in the production of war matériel (Hunter & Leveau 5). In total, about 80,000 North Africans troops 
also fought on the side of the French. While this was considerably less than their contribution to the 
World War I effort, Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians still played a key role in staving off the 
German incursion and occupation. By 1947, Algerians working in France were granted the status of 
‘French Muslim’, “making it clear [that] they were not entitled to the same rights as Frenchmen” 
(Schneider 11). This sustained subordination would only see itself exacerbated as North Africans, 
particularly Algerians, contributed to the post-war rebuilding initiatives. 
 The violence and carnage of the Second World War left France a “devastated country with 
respect to both human resources and material circumstances” (Witte 80): a situation which 
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necessitated a comprehensive rebuilding effort. This came partly through Algerians serving as 
ostensibly temporary labor, with their numbers in France increasing from approximately 100,000 
in 1945 to 250,000 in 1950. As presented by Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, this growth rate was the 
most sizable of any colonial people group tasked in the rebuilding effort; indeed by 1954 their 
annual rate of increase of 32.5 percent dwarfed the overall immigration rate of 1.3 percent (Shen 
21). This influx of workers, however, was poorly facilitated and managed. As more and more North 
Africans were shoveled into France, housing accommodations became scarcer, giving rise to shanty 
towns referred to as the bidonvilles. The conditions of these areas were very poor, with ramshackle 
construction and poor plumbing. Social and hygienic necessities were placed by the wayside to 
keep down social welfare costs. Figure 2 clearly shows the dilapidated state of these bidonvilles. 
Figure 2 – Example of French bidonville settlement 
 
Source: Slide Share 
 By 1970 there were some 900,000 North Africans in France, with Algerians constituting 
about 650,000. Seasonal immigration took place, with additional long-term settling primarily by 
Algerians. By 1973 the Algerian population rose to about 800,000. The nature of immigration 
dramatically changed, however, in the wake of the global 1973 oil embargo ushered in by OPEC 
nations. France experienced a swift economic downturn, meaning that their economy, at least for 
the time being, could not absorb North African employment. As a result, by July 1974 in response to 
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this global oil crisis, immigration of non-European workers was prohibited. This ceasing of 
migration arose in part from the notion of seuil de tolerance or “threshold of tolerance”, and the 
assertion “that racism and racist conflicts (i.e. racist violence) could be prevented only by (1) 
stopping immigration and (2) dispersal policies with respect to the immigrant population” (Witte 
90). The primary dispersal technique was placement of immigrants on the periphery of the French 
cities. Along with the discontinuation of immigration, the French also worked towards repatriation 
of North Africans currently in France; however, these efforts were largely unsuccessful. 
 The 1974 decree for halting immigration backfired on the French. This manifested itself in 
two primary ways. First, the seasonal workers in France at the time of the policy decision remained 
in France subversively in the fear that they might never be able to return to France if sent back to 
North Africa. It also resulted in increased instances of illegal entrance into France during 1974 and 
subsequent years.  The second way in which the immigration policy decision had an adverse effects 
was the massive arrival of the families of these formerly ‘turnover’ migrants, “which raised new 
issues of multiculturalism” as the non-French population increased (Pauly 36-37). The French state 
strove “to discourage reunification of these immigrants’ families, [thus] immigrants’ access to 
housing projects was severely restricted” (Verdugo 8). This resulted in placing these families in 
housing projects on the periphery of French cities, a geo-societal phenomenon that would have 
long-lasting implications. 
 Immigration flow once again increased due to the political turmoil in Algeria during the 
Civil War of the 1990s. In addition to the fleeing from conflict, this “third wave” of immigration also 
included migrants seeking family reunification and searching for the flexible, low-skilled labor 
positions that were blossoming in France. The population boom from across North Africa during 
that time was something France was ill-equipped to handle, resulting in further relegation of new 
arrivals into the isolated housing projects that lined the outskirts of French cities. As the Algerian 
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Civil War continued to rage on, immigration numbers swelled. As presented in 1996 by the 
Archdiocese of Paris, there were approximately 4 million Muslims in France, with 1.5 million from 
Algeria, 1 million from Morocco, and 350,000 from Tunisia (Hunter & Leveau 6). The rates of 
immigration to France since 1945 are represented in Figure 3. Note the leveling off of Algerian, 
Tunisian, and Moroccan immigration in 1999, a direct result of conflict in North Africa. 
Figure 3- The number of foreigners living in France in France since 1945 
 
Source: Those Who Can See 
 
North African Geography 
 Documenting exactly where North African immigrants and their descendants live in France 
today is difficult in considering the French government’s aversion on collecting statistics on the 
basis of race. However, there is data on the distribution of the Muslim population at large. While 
this information is far from ideal, it does present a strong survey of the North African settlement 
pattern in general due to the fact that a vast majority of French Muslims are indeed North African. 
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In Figure 4, we see that there are certain departments where Muslims make up more than 30 
percent of the population, coinciding with historic migration patterns. When coupled with Figure 5, 
it is clear that urban centers stand out as destinations for North African settlement. Paris, indicated 
in number 75 of Figure 4, Lille, number 59, Lyon, 69, Marseilles, 13, and Nice, 6, all house persons at 
a rate of 5,000 persons or more per square kilometer. Important to note is the dense settlement in 
the North east of France, once a prosperous industrial area that has fallen in economic importance.  
 
 
 
 
 
Economic and Social Conditions 
 The seeds of animosity that were sown in various waves of historical immigration have 
culminated in various forms of societal strain. North Africans face disadvantage in labor markets, 
Figure 4 – The Distribution of the Muslim 
Population in France 
 
Figure 5 – The Distribution of the Urban 
Population  
 
Source: Le blog de Abdellali Hajjat 
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which tends to translate into disadvantage in housing. Difference in labor market outcomes were 
apparent early on, with immigrants relegated to unskilled, low-paid labor with high turnover and 
minimal prospects of advancement. This practice of labor subordination exemplifies the 
economists’ idea of a “dual labor market” in which jobs are segmented into the primary “established 
position[s] in society” (Piore & Doeringer 246) and secondary “low-status jobs… filled by ethnic 
workers” (Peck 51). The dual labor market is characterized by a dichotomy between the prospects 
of job security and upward social mobility. The primary sector represents attractive, white-collar 
jobs, while the secondary represents blue-collar, menial labor. According to the Observatoire des 
Inégalités, 46 percent of foreigners in France are of the working class, as compared to 25 percent of 
Frenchmen (Dechaufour 7). 
 This duality is evidenced in the sectors in which Native French and North Africans are 
working. In Slow Motion: The Labor Market Integration of New Immigrants in France, authors Simon 
and Steichen present sectional variation in employment. As evidenced by Figure 6, the bulk of 
native French from 2009-2011 worked in Public Administration, Education, and Social Work at 31.1 
percent, as compared to 12.6 percent of North African residents. Additionally, the field of 
Construction was comprised primarily of North African labor at 10.8 percent as compared to the 
native 6.4 percent. Native French represented larger shares in Financial and Insurance Activities 
and Manufacturing, while immigrants saw an employment advantage in Service Support. These 
figures help to shed light on the tendency towards a dichotomy in the French labor market. These 
figures are by no means ideal, as the data fails to indicate at what level in the hierarchy North 
Africans find themselves in a particular sector. Regardless, they are important as a reinforcement of 
trends in the labor market which lead to stagnated financial advancement. 
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Figure 6 – French Employment Sectors 2009-2011 
 Public 
Administration, 
Education, 
Social Work 
Construction 
Financial and 
Insurance 
Activities 
Manufacturing, 
Mining, and 
Energy 
Service 
Support 
Activities 
Native French 31.1% 6.4% 3.5% 14.4% 9.9% 
North Africans 12.6% 10.8% 1.1% 12.0% 22.7% 
Source:  Simon & Steichen 
Along with job market disadvantage and perhaps increasing it has been the 
disproportionate relegation of North Africans to public housing, leaving them spatially 
disconnected from viable jobs and adequate schooling. Referred to by numerous names, including 
the cités, banlieues, grandes ensembles, and Habitation à Loyer Modéré (HLM), public housing 
projects relegate North Africans to social segregation and inhibit their opportunity. Nearly 50 
percent of all North African immigrants reside in these residential towers, which are located 
primarily on the outskirts of Paris, Marseille, Lille, and Lyon. This percentage is staggering 
considering that only 17.6 percent of native French reside in HLM, yet comprise some 90 percent of 
the population. The banlieues are areas “marked by poverty, welfare dependence, black markets, 
broken families, and single mothers” (Laurence &Vaïsse 36). They have become known as zones de 
non-droit, “lawless zones”, where gangs propagate their seedy agendas and grip families in cycles of 
fear (Caldwell 125). Couple this with negligence of French social services, and it is clear how 
detrimental for their residents these housing experiments truly are. 
 In order to understand France’s housing projects, it is useful to look at how they fit into the 
housing history of North Africans in France. By the late 1960s, the temporary shantytowns used to 
house arriving North African migrants, the bidonvilles, with their lack of running water and sewer 
systems, were presenting themselves as horrendous options for long-term housing in France. 
Additionally, they were grossly overcrowded as presented in figure 7, housing some 20,000 people. 
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Figure 7 – North African Population size in the shantytowns of the Paris region, 1965  
 
Source: SciencePo 
An opportunity arose to place these migrants in the aforementioned HLM 2 as French families 
moved into more traditional, one- or two-story homes. As presented by Dubet and Lapeyronnie, 
HLM became “repositories for all France’s social ills and unwanted populations” (Shen 58), areas 
where France could cast migrants with little accountability and no cognition of assimilation 
procedures. What has resulted in France is a runaway growth of North Africans settling in these 
structures. The rates of North African residence in HLM-style housing in the outskirts of French 
                                                          
2
 Habitations à Loyer Modéré have been appropriately described as “Ugly high-rise and high-density 
complexes in distant and increasingly segregated suburbs, poorly served by public transportation and lacking 
in greenery [that have become] home to the majority of sub-Saharan and North African immigrants” 
(Schneider 12). 
Tyler Parker 
The Ohio State University 
Department of Geography 
 
14 
 
cities in 1982, 1990, and 1999 rose to 34.2 percent, 42.6 percent, and 47.9 percent respectively, 
ultimately culminating to the 50 percent figure that we see today (Verdugo 9).  
 The most detrimental feature of public housing is the way it spatially segregates its 
residents from mainstream France, and the ensuing social and economic deprivation that this 
segregation fosters. Of these areas, usually ten kilometers from the centers of their adjacent cities, 
most “lacked amenities such as shopping, metro lines, schools, or recreational spaces, increasing 
residents’ sense of social isolation” (Mitchell 12). This inability to break into the greater French 
economic and social sphere results from a “residential sorting process” wherein social stratification 
is exacerbated by the lack of social worth that residing in the banlieues entails (Cox 148). This 
culminates in the sense that the banlieues constitute “spaces of banishment” (Mitchell 16) where 
North Africans must remain, void of the opportunities that mainstream French enjoy. The 
prevailing notion is that the youth, really all age segments, of these banlieues are ill-equipped to 
acclimate into proper French society, leaving them to languish away in their isolation. 
 
France’s North African Question  
 Native French are at odds with their North African community. France prides itself on its 
social and institutional aversion to religion, and it plays a key role in policy decisions. This position 
is referred to as laïcité. The current model of this state-directed secularism arose from the Law of 
1905 that presented a clear division between church and state, asserting that the Republic grant no 
special recognition or subsidies to any religious group. In the development of the law, secularism 
was deemed a critical social element due to the notion that “traditional religion [was] inferior to the 
new rational ways of understanding” (Mishra). Beginning with the large-scale migration of North 
Africans into France during the First World War, many in France viewed Islam as a threat 
encroaching on the institution of laïcité. This view has had adverse effects on the North African 
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populace, leading to a stigmatization that facilitates subjugation. Here, I will outline the particular 
nuances of French secularism in order to show how its norms actively factor into separatist 
dispositions among North Africans. 
 First, it is important to distinguish between the two types of secularism present in France. 
The first is that of soft, or “open” and “pluralist” secularism. This is a rather benign form that seeks 
“inter-religious understanding and public dialogue among different religious groups” in an effort to 
bolster social cohesion (Soper & Fetzer 937). While this type is still adamant in the importance of a 
church-state divide in the building of religious houses of worship or providing social services, it 
strives to foster the free exercise of religion, even in the public sphere. This is seen as the premier 
way through which to foster integration. It typically follows the ideology of secular cosmopolitans 
who understand the values of a pluralist society. Unfortunately, many in France do not adhere to 
this style of secular thinking due to the pervasive fear that religious accommodation will lead to a 
disregard of the secular values of equality and reason. 
 The more ever-present interpretation of laïcité is that of hard, or “strict” and “closed” 
secularism. In this interpretation private practice of religion is accepted as a reality in immigrant 
communities. This secular view, however, decries the outward expression of religious adherence 
due to the notion that is represents a threat to Republican values. This is the philosophy 
championed by conservative locals found in the ranks of the FN and throughout rural France. The 
primary “exterior manifestations” that this view rejects include: “[p]raying in public, refusing to eat 
[non-halal] food…, and wearing religiously distinctive clothing” (Soper & Fetzer 937). All of these 
practices are viewed as proselytization efforts on the part of Muslims. A particular concern for 
French society and policy makers is the hijab, the veil that many Muslim women wear. There has 
been a long rhetorical and legal battle over the hijab in France. Thus, it serves as a strong example 
of the French fervor of suppressing the Islamic identity of the nation. 
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 The French have long viewed the veil “as a symbol of Islam’s primitive backwardness” 
(Mishra), a tangible representation of Islamic and Arab society as inherently inferior to that of the 
French. A watershed moment occurred in September of 1989 in Creil, France when three Muslim 
girls were expelled from school for refusing to remove their head covering. This affaire du foulard 
ushered in a decade and a half of debate on the role of the veil in violating France’s policy on 
separation of church and state. In 2004, the Statsi Commission declared a ban on the hijab in “state 
primary and secondary schools” for its “witness to a pupil’s religious affiliation” (Raymond 9). 
Conservative politicians such as Jacque Chirac or Raffarin were adamant that the veil conveyed a 
political agenda in the ranks of France’s North African Muslim population. Even socialists and 
moderates feared the headscarf served to subjugate woman and spur radical tendencies. Thus, the 
banning of Muslim headscarves may be though as a means to “prevent potential development of 
dual loyalties” (Laurence &Vais̈se 167), among North Africans. 
 The French government created the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in 2003 as a 
mechanism through which to engage with Muslim communities in France through a formal 
structure. The CFCM was created as “a Muslim counterpart for practical discussions of policy” 
(Bowen 48). However, it has actively worked towards influencing Muslims to mitigate their Arab-
Muslim cultural and political disposition, doing little to facilitate any reconciliation in fostering 
social and cultural diversity and inclusion. 3 The organization is insufficiently scoped, interacting 
with affluent Muslims while disregarding the needs of those in the banlieues. It fails to serve as a 
voice for North African Muslims to improve their social position in France. 
 Alongside religious aversion to North Africans is the notion of their inherent violence. Due 
to the pervasive notion of the banlieues as areas that harbor violence and disunity, many in France 
believe that all North African youth exhibit these qualities. For some, this violence is simply 
                                                          
3
 As presented in Integrating Islam, “The government [has] used domestication and incorporation as 
instruments to target and transform the transnational characteristics of Muslim populations” (Laurence & 
Vaïsse 138). 
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sociological in nature- an out lash against French values and privilege. Others, however, see a clear 
religious nature in the violence. Former Interior Minister Cheve nement said it best when he 
asserted that “a humiliated identity is a radicalized identity” (Laurence & Vais̈se 144). The vacuum 
created in the lives of North African youth is filled by organizations that claim to present a nucleus 
through which they may find group identity, meaning, and purpose. It is not uncommon for foreign 
imams to serve as mouthpieces for groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood, or even 
al-Qaeda, who actively use mosques as a recruitment zone for their newest fighters. As of January 
2015, some 1200 French citizens have been reported as traveling to Syria and Iraq to fight. This 
figure is only surpassed by the numbers reported from Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia. The 
gunmen who carried out the Charlie Hebdo attacks had known connections to al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula that were cultivated while in a French prison.  
 French aversion to North Africans has manifested itself as both a social and political 
phenomenon. The far-right political group the Front national, as an outgrowth of an ostensibly 
more radical North African populace, has gained ground in France’s political arena. This party, 
founded in 1972 by rightist Jean-Marie Le Pen, holds nationalism and anti-immigration policies 
with particular importance. They pander to rural or less-educated native French who believe that 
North Africans are a violent threat to French peace and hegemony. They gained ground throughout 
the 1990s as a key supporter of a strict adherence to traditional law and order decrees in France, 
serving as a critical voice in the aforementioned headscarf ban. In the 2012 Presidential election, Le 
Pen’s daughter Marine Le Pen finished third in the countries first-round of elections, garnering 
6,421,426 votes, or 17.90 percent. The group is characterized by a wide geographic spread in its 
constituency, meaning that their meager two seats in the French National Assembly has more to do 
with proportional representation than waning support.  
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The North African’s France Question 
 North Africans perpetually feel the brunt of French neglect for their social and religious 
betterment. For one, there is lack of respect for, and facilitation of, Islamic culture, the faith to 
which most North Africans adhere. Due to adherence of the 1905 secularization law, training for 
religious leaders is virtually non-existent. As a result, of the about 1000 imams in France, only 
about 10 to 20 percent are French citizens. These imams, many of whom arise from the Islamic 
madrasas of Morocco,4 are functioning to influence the susceptible young minds of their mosques 
towards more pronounced degrees of separation from French social and culture values. As 
presented by sociologist Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, these foreign Imams are “using the loss of 
identity values and the feeling of exclusion to develop a ‘catch all’ strategy’” in incorporating them 
into fundamental networks (Pauly 42). Indeed, foreign Imams function to exacerbate tensions in 
French society with their fire-brand rhetoric, which in many cases leads to radicalization and 
extremist tendencies. This functions to perpetuate negative stereotypes against all North Africans 
and further marginalizes those who truly wish to be functioning members of French society. 
 Some of the North Africans most hard hit by social marginalization are second and third 
generation French citizens of North African descent. These youth and their families have a difficult 
time reconciling between their French, Arab, and Muslim social and cultural identities. All too often 
they are confronted with exclusion - from mainstream France with the stunted prospect of stable 
white-collar employment and living conditions and by their North African relatives with 
dispositions of them being too western or disconnected with their mother language and religion. 
The racial discrimination and scorn, primarily from native French, that they confront on a daily 
basis drives their push towards dis-assimilation at best and fundamentalism at worst. 
 
                                                          
4
 Morocco is the source of many imams due to the rich religious tradition that was permitted to develop due 
to the fact that Morocco was viewed more as a state than a possession. 
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An Interpretive Framework for Explanation 
 What are we to make of this fissure in French society in terms of its interactions between 
native French and North African residents and citizens? On the one hand, it may be that the French 
view their social condition in the context of an inherent superiority decreed from their strong 
Republican laicism. The North African “Other” is merely a residual holdover from the glorious 
colonial experiment, possessing little more than burden for contemporary France with its odd 
cultural practices and charged religious disposition. It could also be that native French are simply 
alarmed by a growing foreign presence in France, a force that challenges the very meaning of home. 
It is likely, though, that the situation falls somewhere between the two, where French notions of 
racial and cultural superiority impact policy decisions which disenfranchise North Africans, leading 
to increased episodes of backlash.  
 
Some Historical Background 
First of all, in trying to understand this relationship between the native French and those 
tracing their origins back to North Africa, one cannot ignore the importance of the old colonial 
relationship and the attitudes it spawned. In that regard it is important to review some of that 
history. Algeria was the first of the three colonies. By 1848 it had been subjugated and divided into 
what would be three départments of the French state, Algiers, Constantine and Oran, even while the 
political rights of the indigenous peoples were severely limited. This is something that would 
become more and more apparent as European settlers moved in and monopolized those rights. The 
French authorities quickly discovered the agricultural and commercial value of their new territory, 
and subsidized land sales for European purchase. This resulted in tens of thousands of settlers, 
referred to as colons or pieds noirs, arriving from working-class communities not just in France, but 
also Spain and Italy. The new arrivals quickly found themselves in a privileged position, including 
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exemption from many colonial taxes, living conditions that were exponentially more attractive and 
sanitary than those of native North Africans, and hefty education allocations.  
These benefits represented the pronounced dichotomy in “the dualistic society of the 
colony” that would continue to impede social cohesion (MacMaster 6). Coupled with the 
preferential treatment of Europeans was the stifling of Algerian opportunity, including crippling 
limitations on social mobility, employment prospects, and adequate schooling. Resultant 
differences in occupations, education, and material circumstance would then reinforce the notion of 
a mental superiority among the French and a view of the colonized peoples as “backward and lower 
down the scale of human progress” (Lloyd & Waters): a phenomenon that would continue to shape 
the French attitude to North Africans. 
By 1881 Tunisia had been added to the list of French colonies in North Africa. The French 
colonial authorities implemented reforms in the courts and educational practices, ushering in more 
western practices. The absence of a substantial settler population, however, meant that Tunisians 
retained possession of the land, continued to dominate commerce, and experienced less 
stigmatization. The colony nevertheless served as a critical source for colonial labor, particularly 
the ubiquitous seasonal migration to the French mainland. The protectorate survived the two 
World Wars, and Tunisia was able to claim independence on March 20, 1956. 
After acquiring Tunisia, France focused on Morocco, a region embroiled in various claims by 
France, Spain, and Germany dating back to at least 1905. By 1911 the Protectorate of Morocco was 
created. The Moroccan case possessed nuances all its own that differentiated it from the Algerian or 
Tunisian one. Most significantly Morocco was internationally viewed more in the context of a state 
than a territorial possession. This afforded traditional Moroccan religious and political leaders 
more power in conducting their affairs. This would later play a role in the current dilemmas 
confronting French society in relation to Islam as it has become a favored source of imams who are 
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relatively fundamental in their views. Ultimately, Mohammed V negotiated an end to the French 
protectorate and Morocco formally gained its independence on April 7, 1956. 
In some respects the experience of decolonization deepened French superiority; now the 
indigenous peoples were not only inferior, they were ungrateful too for all the benefits that French 
colonialism had supposedly brought them. This was particularly the case with Algeria.  Both 
Morocco and Tunisia had acquired independence by 1956 and relatively peacefully. But as a result 
of the presence of a highly privileged settler minority amounting to about ten percent of the 
population and anxious about retaining those privileges, Algeria would be different and there 
would be a protracted war of independence lasting from 1954 to 1962.  
The war of independence left a searing wound in the psyche of both the French and 
Algerians, as the war ultimately claimed 150,000 FLN fighters and about 25,000 Frenchmen, along 
with upwards of 50,000 Algerian sympathizers. When the referendum for Algerian autonomy was 
completed in 1962 a mass exodus commenced, leading to 900,000 settlers or so-called pied-noirs 
fleeing their home of one-hundred-plus years for France. While 100,000 initially decided to stay, 
FLN violence, summed up in the propaganda campaign La valise ou le cercueil (“Suitcase or coffin”,) 
made it clear that they were no longer welcome and nearly all left by the late 1960s. 5 
A group more adversely affected by the need to flee Algeria were the Français musulmans, 
popularly referred to as the Harkis. These native Algerians who had served as soldiers and 
collaborators for France in the war effort were largely neglected upon their arrival into France. 
They were classified as “Muslims” and “refugees”: labels void of the recognition they deserved for 
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 As in the case of the North African migrant worker, the French system was completely ill-prepared for the 
influx of these migrants, anticipating only about one-quarter of a million new arrivals with the fall of Algeria. 
They were relegated to the streets or abandoned dwellings for many years before the French system could 
cope. That being said, their European identity did result in an easier transition compared to native Algerians. 
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their service to the French cause 6(Fellag 7). By and large the some 91,000 Harkis who fled Algeria 
in 1962 faced the same social woes as those of the long-established North African migrant labor and 
congruent pied-noirs relocated communities. While it is true that they escaped likely death by 
fleeing their homeland, they were welcomed with little more than social ostracizing and roadblocks 
to effective inclusion into mainstream France. 
It was not just the settlers who were put out by challenge of the Algerian independence 
movement. They also had their allies in mainland France. The French populace and government 
exhibited increased animosity towards North Africans, due in large part to feelings of denial over 
the loss of colonial territories. Algerians in particular were the targets of violent attacks carried out 
in France, referred to as ratonnades, or “rat hunts.” One of the most pointed episodes of French 
violence against Algerians occurred on October 17, 1961, in the midst of independence 
negotiations. During a demonstration against French rule in Algeria, some 200 North Africans were 
shot and killed by Paris police, their bodies dumped in the Seine River. As presented by Rosenberg: 
‘French governments took a unique interest in these Muslim migrants and subjected them to much 
greater disciplinary controls than any foreigners. The connection between the abuse endured by 
North African migrants between the wars and the violent repression of peaceful demonstrators on 
the notorious night of 17 October 1961 was both logical and direct’ (Schneider 11). As North 
Africans continued to represent the largest sections of foreigners in France, these episodes of 
institutional subjugation would persist. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 As presented by Ms. Fellag in The Muslim Label: How French North Africans Have Become “Muslims” and not 
“Citizens” the Harkis “status as refugees and not citizens… legitimized their invisibility to both social welfare 
programmes and to the general public and let to blatant segregation” (Fellag 8). 
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The Politics of Difference 
 In trying to understand this, I rely upon the concept of the politics of difference. This is 
aimed at explaining the dichotomy found in societies where a superordinate group works towards 
constraining the rights and privileges of an “Other,” as a way of reinforcing an identity as superior, 
but also as a means of realizing certain material interests in the way of employment and housing. I 
also work towards addressing the pervasiveness of racism in France and strive for a more thorough 
comprehension of the various social outlooks in the country. 
Many French people are adamant that North Africans are inherently inferior. In its origin, 
this notion arises primarily from the colonial period when the French sought to understand their 
supposed social advancement and rationality vis-à-vis the barbarism and Islamic “superstition” of 
the colonized. In viewing themselves as intellectually and socially more advanced, the French could 
justify colonialism through their so-called “civilizing mission.” Privileged segments of society work 
towards validation of preexisting advantage, by “[d]efining others as different, as lacking, and 
[through] disparaging them” (Cox 145). This creation of a dichotomy in society is important for 
French hegemony: due to the deep-seated, fundamental inferiority that North Africans supposedly 
exhibit, as well as contemporary notions of North Africans representing an uneducated, violent 
under class, they will, it is argued, never assimilate fruitfully. Some French even goes so far as to 
perpetuate racially offensive and demeaning stereotypes of North Africans as backwards and 
radicalized,7 further rooting their second-class status in society.  
Many French subordinate North Africans through relegating them to the status of an 
“Other.” This designation has arisen due to a supposed “threat to the cultural values of the ‘host 
country’” (Ferjani 4) that North Africans represent in their language, religion, and presence in the 
job market. The very concept of ‘home’ for many French is being attacked. In interacting with North 
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 As presented by Pankaj Mishra, “Crude depictions of already segregated minorities, though protected and 
even sanctioned by the state’s ideology, can only result in further ghettoisation and radicalisation, whether 
the targets of degrading ethnic, racial and religious stereotypes are devout or atheistic” (Mishra). 
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African physical landscapes (halal butcheries and mosques), as well as social ones (religious garb 
and the Arabic language), some native French feel as though the French they grew up in no longer 
exists. In order to safeguard Republican values, mainstream French society strives to create a 
national community of “we” that that can be safeguarded from the “you” that North Africans 
present by “stigmatizing [them and] underlining their otherness” (Raymond 3). This theme of 
fundamental difference creates a binary lens through which French are viewed as enlightened and 
civilized and North Africans are viewed as backward and threatening to social order. This has 
detrimental results on the psyche of North African citizens in terms of reconciling their identity and 
position to the larger frame of society and leads to anti-assimilationist tendencies. 
A crucial area in which this politics of difference may be playing out is in job markets. One 
reason for the dual labor markets seems to be discrimination in the job application process spurred 
by professional aversion towards North Africans. Indeed, North African-ness is a code of sorts that 
signals poor education or criminal tendencies. It is common for North African youth, usually with 
Muslim “sounding” names, to be judged based on these notions. Their resumés are frequently cast 
aside in favor of a resumé with a more “French” name, regardless of the merits of the application. In 
one case study, an identical application packet was submitted for the fictitious “Marie Diouf” and 
“Khadija Diouf”, with Marie receiving “a positive response on 21% of her applications”, as opposed 
to Khadija’s 8 percent.  Furthermore, “[f]or every 100 interviews that Marie was called for, Khadija 
was summoned for just 38” (Yong). This is by no means an isolated case. 8 In many job sectors, a 
Muslim applicant will be about 2.5 times less likely to obtain a position as compared to a 
comparable Christian counterpart. This has disastrous effects on the economic security of North 
Africans and their ability to sustain employment, as well as to move into improved housing in parts 
of the city where the schools are of the sort that will give their children a better chance at life. 
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 As presented in Le Monde, “When six resumes with identical qualifications but different sounding names 
were submitted for 258 job listings, only 5 percent of candidates with North African names received 
interviews while 30 percent of those with traditional French names did” (Laurence & Vaïsse 62). 
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The inability of North Africans to break into the job market is apparent in their high rates of 
unemployment. In January 1999, the unemployment rate for North African Muslims reached 33 
percent, despite government efforts at “positive discrimination” implemented in 1998 (Hunter & 
Leveau 9). More contemporary numbers are harder to come by, due to Republican aversion in 
France to record on the basis of race or ethnicity, but it is likely that this rate has remained stable or 
worsened. The problem of unemployment affects all groups of North African heritage, even those 
with university degrees. In 2002, unemployment for North Africans with a college degree hovered 
at 16 percent, which was double that of the native French (Laurence & Vaïsse 33). The prevalence 
of inequality of opportunity in the workplace for North Africans has widened, as 26.5 percent of 
university graduates of North African descent do not hold jobs. This figure would seem to indicate 
an unwillingness of French companies to hire these prospective employees, suggesting racial or 
cultural bigotry. 
On the other hand, one should grant that there may be other reasons for the weak labor 
market position of North Africans. In virtue of factors including level of education, gender, and 
home-country economic conditions, North Africans are especially susceptible to unemployment. 
Because so much migration is a result of family-reunification of mothers, wives, and children with 
little to no formal education, many new arrivals lack “host-country human capital, such as language 
proficiency, professional networks, and knowledge of local labor market norms” (Simon & Steichen 
2). Language abilities are of particular importance.  INSEE data from 1999 shows that North African 
youth born in France to at least one parent born in Algeria exhibit an unemployment rate of 46 
percent among 25-29 year olds when their mother tongue is Arabic, as compared to 18.4 percent 
for those youth who speak French exclusively. This slows down entry into the job market and 
particularly into those jobs requiring specialized skill. The native French unemployment rate in 
1990 was 10.4 percent overall, with 7.5 percent of men and 14.1 percent of women out of work. 
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Compare this with North African rates in figure 8, and the importance of higher education in France 
presents itself as one factor in mitigating high unemployment rates among North Africans.  
Figure 8 – Unemployment rates by nationality and sex, 1990 
 Percent All Percent Male Percent Female 
Algerian 27.5% 23.1% 42.3% 
Moroccan 25.4% 20.7% 42.5% 
Tunisian 25.7% 22.0% 42.5% 
Source: INSEE 1992. Cited from Haque 2006 
North African access to the labor market is further inhibited by French labor unions, largely 
native French in their membership, and their exclusionary practices. Many French unions deem an 
influx of foreign workers to be a threat to their job security and as such subordinate North Africans 
in work projects. This trend is seen clearly on construction sites, where the majority of hard labor is 
carried out by immigrants. Unions receive their justification for subordination of North Africans 
from the larger frame of French law, where “their exclusion from the political and labor-union 
world is confirmed” (Dechaufour 6) on the basis of their status as foreigners. In this manner, the 
French can continue to ensure that North Africans are placed at the fringes of the job market, 
ensuring that they pose little threat to French privilege there. 
French policy response to the plight of North Africans in the labor market has been 
particularly pernicious, laying the majority of the blame upon the North Africans and a supposed 
unwillingness to adjust to the demands of the economy. Sociologist Oliver Roy stated that “a self-
fulfilling sense of exclusion prevents many of these [migrant] youngsters from entering the new 
economy” (Schneider 6). Here, there is the assertion that North African defeatism and 
unwillingness to mold to French expectation are the primary cause for rampant unemployment. 
Former Minister of Interior and President Sarkozy is more venomous in his interpretation of the 
situation, claiming that the root causes behind unemployment are “the drug traffic, the law of 
bands, the dictatorship of fear and resignation of the Republic” (Schneider 6). This rhetoric of 
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viewing the North Africans as responsible for their own social situation is common, while ignoring 
the institutional mechanisms that spur social polarization. 
A second area in which the politics of difference has been evident is in policing. The grands 
ensembles in which many North Africans reside are indeed marked by the prevalence of drugs, 
violence, and poverty, which in turn induces a larger police presence. The issue that has arisen is 
the notion that North African immigrants in their entirety represent criminals with whom French 
security services must engage. This stereotype has resulted in a shift away from “social 
development to ‘security,’ and has exacerbated the everyday harassment of non-white youth” 
(Mitchell 14). With arrest quotas in place, interactions between police and North African youth 
have become more charged. Indeed, Arab youth are disproportionally singled out in police 
operations, prone to unreasonable instances of police verbal harassment, random identity checks, 
and even physical brutality. 
Police brutality is an unfortunate reality in polarized communities, and the cités of France 
are no different. In societies where ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities are present, police 
often perform their duties “cruelly and with violence” (Schneider 7). It is not readily apparent why 
many police departments prefer punitive strategies of high arrest counts and physical 
confrontation with those suspected of criminal acts. Community policing characterized by an 
interpersonal relationship with the residents of a certain housing area has proven much more 
effective. In response to the domineering presence of French police in the banlieues, North African 
youth have lashed out. This antagonism, spurred on by a lack of mutual understanding, results in 
increased rates of violent crimes and further mitigates any possibility of societal cohesion. 
Institutional mechanisms condition racist policies and actions. At the level of policy 
decisions, racism is denied as a social problem because all citizens of the Republic are viewed as 
equal. This has negatively affected the prospect of social improvement in cases where genuine 
Tyler Parker 
The Ohio State University 
Department of Geography 
 
28 
 
racism is found, for bills against discrimination rarely pass the National Assembly and racist acts 
are seldom prosecuted. 9 What has resulted from this negligence of viewing racism in its proper 
socio-economic context has been a strong shift from “prevention and rehabilitation toward 
individual accountability, restitution and retribution” (Terrio). Sarkozy cut funding for social 
programs servicing the banlieues and was unenthusiastic about the idea of community policing. He 
also instituted a “zero-tolerance” policy on “quality of life crimes”, namely, loitering, begging, and 
jumping of metro turnstiles (Schneider 16-17). This had led to non-violent, misdemeanor crimes 
now carrying felony sentences of upwards of six months, showcasing in effect that a different type 
of justice governs North African youth.  
This push to criminalize non-violent behavior has led to abnormally high rates of 
incarceration for North African males. Throughout Metropolitan France, Muslims, most of whom 
are North Africans, make up about seven percent of the population yet constitute upwards of 70 
percent of the French prison system (Mahamdallie). The banlieues are particularly affected by high 
incarceration rates. As sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar states, “prisoners with a North African 
father outnumber prisoners with a French father by 9 to 1” for youth eighteen to twenty-nine 
(Laurence &Vaïsse 41). The primary point that must be emphasized is that North Africans are six 
times more likely than native French to be incarcerated for non-violent crimes. 10 This has been 
justified as a means of “cleaning up the streets” in the grands ensembles, but has only resulted in 
enhanced feelings of angst among North Africans as they reconcile their position in society.   
Facing general societal racism, police aggression, and high incarceration rates, North 
Africans have reacted, often violently. The primary case is that of the French riots of October 2005 
                                                          
9
 According to a study by Roché and Dagnaud, “although hundreds of incidents [of racist acts against citizens 
of North African descent] were reported, just seven cases were brought to court in 1999, twelve in 2001, and 
twenty-nine in 2002” (Laurence &Vaïsse 42). 
10
 As presented by Pierre Tournier, “[foreigners] were most disproportionately arrested for nonviolent 
crimes (40.6 percent of those arrested for forgery and 29.2 of those arrested for narcotics offenses, 85 
percent of whom were arrested for cannabis). More than half hailed from three countries—Algeria, Morocco, 
and Tunisia” (Schneider 14). 
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that arose from the death of two youth of North African descent as they hid from police in a power 
transformer. The deaths led to a two-week period across major French cities that presented “the 
worst and most widespread civilian violence Western Europe had seen in decades”, with some 
“eight thousand cars burned and 2,900 people arrested” (Caldwell 137). Youth, largely of North 
African descent, targeted French businesses and citizens, justifying these actions on the basis of the 
systemic inequality they face. The angst of North African communities only serves to enhance the 
mainstream French notion that beurs, as North African youth are called, present a “violent 
opposition to society” through “criminality and provocative behaviour” (Roy 65), at odds with the 
civil rationality of France. The 2005 riots, as well as smaller episodes of 2007, have only led to an 
expansion of xenophobic notions in mainstream France.  
Plagued by exclusion in French social networks and general lack of respect, North Africans 
have exhibited a move towards communalism that distances them from broader French society.  
Rather than continue exposure to French racism, and animosity, they frame their social interactions 
among themselves exclusively. 11 As presented by Smolar, “[s]ometimes cultural isolationism is 
combined with the rejection of western values to construct a negative identity that mixes homeland 
culture [and] neighborhood values” (Laurence &Vaïsse 94). This poses difficulty for the prospect of 
sociabilité, the concept of “deeper contracts, even intimacy, between people of different cultures” 
(Caldwell 130), due to the fact that ideological walls are constructed as North African citizens and 
residents revert into their own parallel societies within France. This problem is only worsened by 
the technology of today and how it enhances the ability of French North Africans to connect to a 
broader Arab culture. 
In an effort to find a place of their own in French society, many North Africans find solace in 
connecting with the media of their mother tongue: Arabic. Hundreds of thousands of North African 
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 Caldwell notes that “[a]s the generations passed, the children of immigrants would found more, not fewer, 
foreign establishments; develop more, not fewer, separatist sentiments; and demand more, not fewer, 
concessions from the country at large” (Caldwell 132). 
Tyler Parker 
The Ohio State University 
Department of Geography 
 
30 
 
apartments and households beam in sitcoms from Algeria, news from Qatar, and religious programs 
from Saudi Arabia. By 1994, one million satellite dishes were installed in France, with a sizable one-
quarter of these owned by Arabic speaking families. As presented by the author Bouachera, there is 
concern in France that the continual streaming of Arabic will in the least “compromise the years of 
effort to increase the level of French literacy and the assimilation of these communities,” and at the 
most severe “exacerbate the tendency to[wards] fundamentalism” (Ferjani 5). Indeed, it seems that 
Arabic-language television works to “both extend and to catalyze tensions at work in French 
society” (Ferjani 16) and makes the prospect of assimilation ever-more elusive. Figure 9 depicts an 
example of satellite dishes on an HLM residence. 
Figure 9 – Satellite dishes on residence in Clichy-sous-bois 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
The xenophobia developed in native French citizens has resulted in stereotypes that regard 
North Africans as unable to assimilate into the country as a whole. The animosity cultivated among 
the French results in pronounced examples of race-motivated hate crimes. According to the 
Ministry of the Interior in statistics compiled from 1990-1991,“[t]he racist targeting of North 
African migrants or their descendants, the ‘second generation’ Beurs, in incidences of abuse, 
assault, and murder is higher than for any other minority group” (MacMaster 1). In addition to 
instances of physical assaults, the free use of racial slurs is common on the French street. In the 
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climate of racism cultivated in French media and psyche, this practice serves to subordinate and 
humiliate North Africans. As stated by Hargreaves, between 1980 and 1993 Maghrebi residents and 
citizens were the object of 78 percent of recorded hate crimes, despite constituting no more than 40 
percent of the foreign population at the time (Shen 40).  
A particular brand of racism that has arisen in the post-9/11 world is that of Islamophobia. 
This is anti-Muslim prejudice that portrays Islam as a despotic, stagnant religion “uniquely 
vulnerable to irrational, extreme interpretations” (Mahamdallie). This phenomenon is particularly 
pronounced against North Africans due to their largely Arab ethnicity and practice of Islam. The 
animosity towards North Africans has expanded beyond fear of incorporation into the workforce or 
access to housing, and now extends to fears of an Islamic proselytism portending societal 
degradation. In the words of Yonnet, Muslims pose a threat to the present “bio-ethno-religious 
homogeneity” of France (House 223) and as such must be contained. The notion that North Africans 
are hostile to the values of the republic is only exacerbated by their Islamic character. 
In this instance, the politics of difference has a deep-seated lineage in European imperial 
identity creation. The French mission civilisatrice shares key tenets with the British imperialist 
notion of the “white man’s burden”, namely the critical role that European nations hold in bettering 
the social and economic conditions of societies deemed stunted in their lineal development. The 
feeling of superiority that accompanies any instance of social dichotomy is heightened in the French 
case due to the bloody battle for independence that played out in Algeria. The war left an indelible 
mark on the psyche of many French and North Africans serve as an adequate release point for much 
resentment of the French. This manifests itself in many forms, from economic discrimination to 
outright racism. 
As articulated throughout this paper, North Africans have reacted to French exceptionalism 
by reverting to their own forms of counter-culture. This allows them to search for an identity that 
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dredges some self-worth out of a social milieu that is particularly disadvantageous for social and 
ethnic diversity. On means in which Arab youth seek to counteract the hardships of an imposed 
otherness is reject mainstream French culture, as showcased in their utilization of verlan. This is a 
range of French that incorporates morphological and lexical elements from Algerian Arabic that 
serves “as a verbal rebellion against French as the language of colonization” (The Economist).  In 
this way, as in others, North Africans are able to proclaim their rightful place in French society, 
unable to be stifled under the tenets of Republican secularism. 
 
The Politics of Home 
 The concept of ‘home’ for a people group is of paramount importance. This term does not 
refer to the domestic hearth of family and friends, but rather the broader frame of societal shared 
experiences and symbols. These factors, such as national holidays and popular culture norms, shape 
the psyche of people on an individual level. The concept serves as a defining perimeter for the 
national community. ‘Home’ is a demarcating mechanism to determine who is included, thus, who 
may benefit from the privilege of being a part of the exclusive French community. Immigrants, 
North Africans in particular, are deemed to be outside of this frame of belonging due to the sense 
that their language, social practices, and physical manifestations of religion are incurring on the 
French ‘home.’ Many in France feel as though North Africans represent an alien presence of sorts 
that threatens the entire existence of the France they once knew. 
 This is not to say that all in France even believe in a monolithic sense of a French ‘home,’ let 
alone the notion that it is being destroyed. Moderate middle class French citizens, who could be 
thought of as thinking in a particularly cosmopolitan fashion, typically possess nuanced insight on 
cultures other than their own. Indeed this cosmopolitan “surrender[s] to the alien culture, [which] 
implies personal autonomy vis-à-vis the culture where he originated” (Hannerz 240). Through the 
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ability to disengage with irrational fear towards a people group, these largely bourgeois French are 
able to be more pragmatic in their dealings with North Africans. However, it is certainly a reality 
that they will assert and defend French values like after watershed moments such as Charlie Hebdo. 
In the end, though, they will not use laicism as a tool for discriminatory fervor.  
 The same cannot be said for those who are usually less educated, what may be thought of as 
locals. This social group is characterized by predominantly working class native French from 
smaller industrial towns and rural areas who feel that North Africans, and immigrants in general, 
represent a grave threat to the French ‘home.’  Many devote their support for the Front national, 
which heeds their rallying cry of expelling anti-Republican sentiment from France. As evidenced by 
Figure 10, “White collar” jobs, Employés in French, refers to clerical workers or retail staff. They 
supported the Front national in 2015 departmental elections at a rate of 38 percent. 
Figure 10 – The Vote at the Turn of 2015 Departmental Elections 
 Parti socialiste UMP-UDI Front national 
Liberal Professions; Senior Management 28% 33% 13% 
Intermediary Professions 25% 27% 25% 
White Collar Positions 18% 24% 38% 
Workers 15% 13% 49% 
Unemployed 19% 23% 25% 
Retired 23% 37% 20% 
Source: Les-Crises.fr 
 “Workers” supported the Front national at a rate of 49 percent. These Ouvriers, as they are known 
in French, serve primarily as work hands in industrial, agricultural, and distribution sectors. As 
evidenced by the right column of Figure 10, FN support increases heavily as social prominence 
decreases, pointing to the strong influence that the group holds over impressionable minds. 
Appendix A explains the nuances of each job category as understood in France. While xenophobic 
notions of a North African incursion on the French ‘home’ are almost certainly a factor in these 
rates, it seems likely that they are also a by-product of concern over North Africans claiming these 
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same types of jobs for less wages. In this way, locals lash out against North Africans for both 
sentimental and pragmatic reasons. 
 In addition to the professions of locals, their stunted level of educational exposure also 
manifests itself into increased support for the Front national. A university degree, with its common 
focus on a cross-cultural perspective, will generally present to a pupil the importance of respect for 
other social groups. This is largely void in the ranks of locals, as they comprise primarily blue-collar 
economic and social conditions which rarely facilitate a college degree. As such, lower levels of 
education typically lend to much stronger support for the Front national. As evidenced by Figure 
11, those with no diploma support the FN 50 percent of the time. Those that have obtained a CEP or  
Figure 11 – Level of Education and Voting Choice 
 Parti socialite UMP-UDI Front national 
University Degree 24% 36% 16% 
Baccalaureat and Two Years of Further Education 21% 32% 24% 
Baccalaureat 17% 26% 29% 
CEP/BEPC/CAP/BEP 23% 23% 35% 
No Diploma 8% 17% 50% 
Source: Les-Crises.fr  
BEPC, explained in Appendix B, support the FN at a rate of 35 percent. This important because it 
showcases the strong impact that a liberal, diverse education can have on cultural astuteness.  
 
Variation in Belief 
French society is an amalgamation of outlooks. In order to understand the country’s 
conundrum, it is important to see how each segment of society thinks about and interacts with the 
position of North Africans. The French Left has worked towards improving social conditions for 
North Africans, particularly in the context of limiting deportations and expanding family 
reunification. Where they must improve, though, in their connection with North Africans is their 
inability “to acknowledge the racial dimension of social inequalities” (Murray 38). In working 
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towards counteracting geo-social discrimination, whether in housing, labor, or healthcare, they 
have been largely ineffective in addressing the racial components of social disparity. They have a 
difficult time understanding that a great deal of inequality stems from racialized notions of North 
African inferiority. This oversight, in part, allows institutional racism to persist. 
Juxtaposed to the liberal French outlook is that of conservative French ideology. The Right 
uses ideology and rhetoric to ensure that native-born French continue to hold preference over 
immigrants in housing and jobs. The primary weapon in persuading the electorate of this position is 
to assert the threat of “encroachment of Islamic fundamentalist ideas harboured within Muslims” 
(Mahamdallie) The primary target of this claim is North Africans, who make up the majority of 
Muslims in France. The bastion of rightist France, the Front national, long found success in their 
fire-brand approach towards decrying Islam and North Africans. In the wake of leadership 
transition from founder Jean-Marie Le Pen to his daughter Marine, however, the FN has worked 
towards a “de-demonizing” effort to ensure that their racist rhetoric is scaled back. They boast 
some 80,000 members and represent 23 of France’s 74 European Parliament seats. They also fare 
well in municipal elections, for they represent a “protest” vote of sorts that condemns the central 
government and its efforts in immigrant rights. 
The Front national is not the only right-wing voice in France. The Republicans, headed by 
former President of France Sarkozy, occupy the center-right political position in France. Recently, a 
dispute ensued between Sarkozy and European Parliament member Nadine Morano over her 
comment that France is a “white nation”. In the past Morano had been adamant on accepting North 
African migrants, so long as they assimilate into French culture and society. This example of The 
Republicans shows that the Right is having a difficult time of finding a position on the North African 
issue. It seems as though Sarkozy is cognizant of the weight that North Africans possess in France, 
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and thus decried a comment that years past would be of little consequence. It shows that just as 
French society as a whole is not monolithic, neither are the ranks of the right-wing. 
As discussed above, the emotional distance that native French exhibit in the notion of 
France as a ‘home’, incurred upon by North Africans, varies drastically. More leftist, bourgeois 
segments of France, the aforementioned cosmopolitans, characterized by “an intellectual and 
aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences” (Hannerz 239). They typically 
present a more thorough sense of awareness of the effects of French colonialism, and while holding 
firm to French social values of secularism, do seek a more plural voice in France. On the other hand, 
those who are from socially conservative and rural departments of France largely comprise the 
aforementioned locals. Their view asserts that French values face a genuine threat from North 
Africans that must be quelled through more pronounced interpretations of secularism. 
We have already seen that certain educational and occupational norms lend to a particular 
constituency representing the Front national, namely industrial laborers with minimal advanced 
schooling. In Figure 12, we see that the majority of FN support is focused in the Northeast and 
Southeast of the country, areas that are marked by a downturn in industrial production over the  
years. In a comparison with Figure 13 we see a clear correlation between FN support and Muslim 
population percentages, particularly in the North East of the country and the French Riviera. 
 
 
Figure 12 – Percentage of FN support in 
the 2014 European Parliament elections 
Figure 13 – The Distribution of the 
Muslim Population in France 
Source: Le blog de Abdellali Hajjat 
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(The legend for Figure 13 can be found on page 10.) In this regard, Figure 14 provides a cross-
tabulation of departments according to the level of support for the Front national compared to the 
proportion of the population that is Muslim. If FN support increases with the Muslim presence, then 
the larger percentages should gravitate to an axis moving from bottom left to top right and there is 
some clear tendency in that direction. But interestingly, there are some obvious deviations from 
this, particularly in the bottom right of the cross-tabulation, where the asterisked entries 
correspond to areas with lower rates of FN support, but a high Muslim presence. 
Figure 14 – Correlation between FN support and Muslim Population 
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Less than 5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% Greater than 30% 
Greater than 30% 1% 2% 9% 3% 12% 
25-30% 2% 5% 4% 1% 10% 
20-25% 10% 7% 3% 3% 7%* 
Less than 20% 7% 3% 4% 0% 7%* 
Source: Le blog de Abdellali Hajjat 
Significantly these are departments that for the most part are in the Paris region, Lyon and 
Grenoble. All of these areas are characterized by an overrepresentation of native French workers in 
professional, technical, and white collar occupations. These are the members of the social strata 
which tend to register low rates of support for the FN. 
Variation in views of the North African question is not just a prerogative of the native 
French. North African positions are also diverse on numerous levels, and level of adherence to 
Islam is a primary distinguishing factor. Many North Africans are what might be called ‘cultural’ 
Muslims who are relatively secular and aim towards “creat[ing] a synthesis between Islam and 
modernity.” These moderates constitute the largest group of North African Muslims and exhibit the 
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highest degree of upward social mobility as compared to other Muslims. A more zealous disposition 
is that of the fundamentalists whose “primary goal is to encourage a revival of Islam and Islamic 
principles.” The most ardent of groups are the Islamists, and it is they who incite the most 
animosity among the native French. This segment aims to form an ideal Islamic society in France. In 
many cases, this ideology “appeals to a segment of Muslim youth who feel frustrated and excluded” 
(Hunter & Leveau 10), which furthers the notion that, due to their cultural faith, North Africans are 
inherently radical and violent. 
There are groups attempting to counteract this notion.  These groups have emerged from 
the moderates who, with their higher level of social integration, are able to promote civil discourse 
to improve conditions for North Africans. Their strategy is to try to show that French antagonism 
against Arab communities runs counter to the values of the Republic. The group SOS Racisme was 
created in 1984 as one of the first means through which beur youth could organize themselves and 
cultivate “greater acceptance of youth of Arab origin” (Laurence &Vais̈se 70) in mainstream France. 
Another group founded in the 1980s, France Plus, was also formed around winning acceptance of 
North Africans. These groups, along with others, strive to ensure that the North African grievances 
are addressed. Indeed, these organizations “have joined together in what have become known as 
new social movements in order to achieve some moral equality, some equality in terms of a sense of 
social worth” (Cox 163). The social position which North Africans occupy is precarious, 
accentuating the importance of these organizations. 
The theme of social worth that these groups promote may help save those within the North 
African community on the fringes of French society from separatist outlooks, particularly “second- 
and third-generation” youth. Due to a crisis of identity, they have a difficult time assimilating into 
French society. They are stuck in a space of limbo, not entirely in touch with French culture and 
lacking key social and linguistic ties with their families’ country. They are pulled in opposite 
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directions by the cultural allure of North Africa on the one hand, and the gilded promise of the 
Republic on the other. They feel as though something in their lives is missing: that they do not have 
a place where they can be free to self-explore. Often, these youth take up Islam as the means of 
finding a niche in society and reconciling between their polar identities. 
 
Internationalizing the North African Question 
Viewing France’s North African dilemma in the broader frame of European politics is useful 
in understanding its dimensions. There is deep-seated, anti-Muslim sentiment throughout the 
European Parliament, a situation that is only exacerbated by contemporary en masse migration 
from the Middle East and North Africa. In June a coalition referred to as “Europe of Nations and 
Freedoms” was formed by Front national leader Marine Le Pen and includes members from the 
Dutch Party for Freedom, Austria’s Freedom Party, and Italy’s Northern League. A mere 39 
members represent the coalition, the smallest bloc in the European Parliament. With such low 
membership, the group is unlikely to galvanize heavy support. However, their more unified voice 
decrying immigration into European will play a factor in deliberations regarding the ease of 
settlement and assimilation for new arrivals from the Arab world in the coming years. 
Another important factor in the broader frame of the North African question is linkage 
between immigration into Europe and the international war on terror. There is genuine panic 
among the governments of Europe, for they feel that their citizens can become susceptible to the 
fundamental rhetoric of groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. As 
aforementioned, France is currently faced with a surge of their nationals fighting in Syria and Iraq – 
some 1,200 in total. Other countries are plagued by a rash of their young men (and women) going 
to fight in extremist groups, particularly Great Britain which, according to intelligence reports, faces 
as many as 2,000 of their own citizens currently fighting in Syria and Iraq. The response of British 
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governance has been severe, invoking a criminal charge on those that leave the country to fight in 
jihadist endeavors. France, too, must learn how to best deal with their challenges in youth heading 
east to fight. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have worked towards framing the historical, social and cultural reasons for 
the remarkable level of social polarization between native French and North Africans, whether 
recent arrivals or those of the third generation. The prospect for effective social cohesion is 
challenged by numerous French factors including laïcité and the deep wounds of the Algerian 
Revolution. These facets, viewed in the frame of a politics of difference and a politics of home, 
plagues the possibility of assimilation. Through the former, many French relegate North Africans to 
a subordinated role substantiated through a long lineage of colonial subjugation. In the latter, many 
native French lash out at North Africans due to the fear that they represent an alien force that is 
determined to undermine French Republican values. In response to social, economic, and cultural 
marginalization, North Africans galvanize themselves, either along the positive lines of social 
mobilization or the dangerous phenomenon of fundamentalist violence. The situation is convoluted 
by the myriad of social factors at play in the fight for North African social assimilation, whether the 
right-winged Front national, the liberal Partie socialiste, or groups sympathetic to the North African 
cause, notably SOS Racisme. In the end, the quest for genuine social cohesion must arise through a 
nuanced negotiation among all groups with a vested interest in the question. For the time being, 
particularly in light of fundamentalism spurred in all levels of France and increased quotas on 
migration, it seems that the “North African Question” will be as perplexing as ever.  
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Appendix A 
1. Liberal Professions – Professions libérales 
a. Refers to physiotherapists, doctors/surgeons, notaries, lawyers, etc, and other 
similar professionals, whose income comes from 'fees' in payment of their services 
2. Senior Management – Cadres supérieurs 
a. Refers to senior managers in both the public and private sectors 
3. Intermediary Professions - Professions intermédiaires 
a. Encompasses nurses, teachers, accountants, social workers, middle management, 
etc. There is an understanding that they are not 'managers' or decision-makers, but 
they have a skill or a position that is beyond simple execution of tasks. 
4. White Collar Positions – Employés 
a. This category refers to clerical workers, retail staff, and other ‘lower-level’ white-
collar positions 
5. Workers – Ouvriers 
a. These are industrial or factory workers that perform primarily manual labor. 
Positions include: dock workers, seamstresses, farm workers, warehouse 
attendants, municipal gardeners, and trash collectors 
6. Unemployed – Chômeurs 
7. Retired – Retraités 
 
Appendix B 
1. University Degree - Diplôme supérieur 
a. Comprises all other degrees, ranging from Bachelor of Arts/Sciences to Doctoral 
degrees 
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2. Baccalauréat and Two Years of Further Education 
a. This can indicate that one has a post-baccalauréat professional degree (obtained 
through an IUT,  Institut Universitaire Téchnologique, similar to Institutes of 
Technology in the American system) 
3. Baccalaureat - Baccalauréat 
a. This is received at the end of high school 
4. CEP - Certificat d'études Primaires 
a. Received at the end of primary school (A defunct degree; only older generations 
would hold this type of degree) 
5. BEPC - Brevet d'études du Premier Cycle du Second Degré 
a. Received at the end of junior high/middle school, just before entering high school 
6. CAP - Certificat d'Aptitude Professionnelle 
7. BEP - Brevet d'études Professionnelles 
a. These two are professional degrees after 1 or 2 years of studies in a parallel system 
to high school (these would be the degrees that most employés or ouvriers would 
possess) 
8. No Diploma – Pas de diplôme 
a. Denotes that no diploma for schooling has been received 
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